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COLLATERAL DAMAGE:
THE IMPACT OF ACTA AND THE ENFORCEMENT
AGENDA ON THE WORLD'S POOREST PEOPLE
Andrew Rens1
ABSTRACT
ACTA is billed as a trade agreement, and it is likely to have a far reaching
impact on the poorest people in the world. ACTA's purported aim is to
increase the efficacy of enforcement of intellectual property. However, like
the enforcement agenda that gave rise to it, ACTA's provisions threaten
access to medicines, access to learning materials, and access to markets by
developing countries, and in so doing threaten development.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

More than 1.4 billion people in the world live below the poverty line
defined by the World Bank, of 1.25 U.S. dollars a day.2 People living at or
below the poverty line are vulnerable to disease, starvation and the natural
elements and are deprived of medicines, knowledge and power over the
international laws and economic dispositions that affect their daily lives.
What does this have to do with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), currently the subject of secretive negotiations by the United
States, Europe and a few close allies? ACTA is, after all, described by its
advocates as a trade agreement. However, little attention has been paid to
its potential impact on the world’s poorest people. This article points to
some of the ways in which ACTA will almost certainly threaten the world's
poorest people.
ACTA itself is part of a far bigger agenda: the “enforcement agenda.”
The enforcement agenda, taking the guise of strengthening the enforcement
of existing rights, attempts to enact national laws and to create policies and
practises that effectively eliminate existing limitations and exceptions in the
current international intellectual property regime, at least as far as cross
2

Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, The Developing World Is Poorer Than We Thought,
But No Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty 35 (Development Research Group,
World Bank, August 2008), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/JAPANINJAPANESEEXT/Resources/5154971201490097949/080827_The_Developing_World_is_Poorer_than_we_Thought.pdf.blic
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border regulation of intellectual property is concerned. ACTA is the preeminent vehicle of the enforcement agenda. Developing countries have had
a number of recent experiences with the enforcement agenda. These
experiences provide concrete examples of the likely impact of ACTA. This
article sets out to describe in plain terms the likely impact of ACTA on the
world's poor. Doing so requires an understanding of the enforcement
agenda and its primary vehicle—ACTA—which requires drawing on a
great deal of work by others, some if it still in progress. This paper
describes ACTA as both a process and set of provisions, examines its
emergence in the enforcement agenda, and discusses how ACTA threatens
multinational development, especially access to medicines and access to
knowledge.
II.

WHAT IS AT STAKE?

At one time intellectual property law was viewed by both the public in
the developed world and by most developing country policy makers as a
purely technocratic domain. Reliance on expertise effectively disguised
political choices. While this view has changed, it is too often forgotten that
intellectual property laws disproportionately impact the world's poorest
people. How will the enforcement agenda affect the lives of the world’s
poorest people? Will it fracture the multinational intellectual property
regime? Will it derail international co-operation on health, on renewable
energy, and on food security?
III.

THE ENFORCEMENT AGENDA

The “enforcement agenda” is a sustained, wide-ranging effort by
lobbyists for certain industries in crisis to deploy state resources, secure
legislation, and institutionalize practises that support their current business
models under the banner of enforcing intellectual property rights. “The
overall picture that emerges is a web of numerous multilateral forums,
regional and bilateral agreements and unilateral institutions being captured
to pursue a global TRIPS-plus enforcement agenda.”3
The agenda is being realized through a range of means; ACTA,
increasingly onerous enforcement provisions in Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs),4 far reaching national legislation on “counterfeits” (often the results
3

Viviana Muñoz Tellez, The Changing Global Governance of Intellectual Property
Enforcement: A New Challenge for Developing Countries, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 10 (Li &Correa eds. 2009).
4
“Free Trade Agreements” is the name of a type of bi-lateral trade agreement that is not,
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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of “expert technical assistance”) and a cohort of other means. Muñoz
Tellez lists thirteen different international fora where enforcement efforts
are being pursued.5
The enforcement agenda is being set by multinational tobacco,
pharmaceutical, film and record corporations. The Global Business
Leaders’ Alliance Against Counterfeiting (GBLAAC), whose members
include Coca-Cola, Daimler Chrysler, Pfizer, Proctor and Gamble,
American Tobacco, Phillip Morris, Swiss Watch, Nike, and Canon,
sponsored the meeting held in Geneva hosted by Interpol and WIPO on
counterfeiting which appears to have begun the public ACTA process6. The
primary lobbying bodies appear to be the Motion Picture Association, the
Recording Industry Association of America, the International Intellectual
Property Alliance, and the Business Software Alliance, global
pharmaceutical giants, and global tobacco companies7.
Significant features of the agenda are that it seeks to reduce or eliminate
exceptions and limitations to intellectual property law through over-broad
provisions purportedly aimed at infringement. Examples from East Africa
will be used to illustrate this effect. The enforcement agenda seeks to move
the focus of international and national intellectual property policy away
from efforts to reform intellectual property laws to ensure access to
medicines and access to knowledge and instead to dedicate resources to
expanding the reach and impact of the statutory monopolies granted by
intellectual property legislation. The enforcement agenda is often framed in
terms of security, which justifies inroads into civil liberties, recruits new
constituencies to the political economy of intellectual property
maximization, and attempts to stigmatize critics.8 As the enforcement
agenda unfolds across a range of arenas, the impact on real life situations by
the agenda becomes all too clear; presaging the impact of ACTA.
IV.

ACTA

however, confined to trade as traditionally understood, but includes requirements for
changes to the national legislation of signatories, most notably intellectual property
legislation.
5
Muñoz Tellez, supra note 3.
6
Aaron Shaw, The Problem with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (and What To
Do About It), KE STUDIES (2008), http://kestudies.org/ojs/index.php/kes/article/view/34/57.
7
A peculiar difficulty attends ACTA with respect to both the text and the process: the text
has been withheld from the public, and largely from the public's duly appointed
representatives, and that the negotiations do not take place on the public record.
8
Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: the State of Play 4 (IQsensato, Occasional Paper No. 1, June 9, 2008),
available at http://www.iqsensato.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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What is ACTA? Although the few official government announcements
on ACTA have described it as a draft treaty agreement, for developing
countries it is another arena of conflict in an immensely complex strategy of
forum shifting by certain multinational corporations. Susan Sell describes
the process as the latest iteration in a longer process:
Since the early 1980s advocates of a maximalist IP agenda
have shifted forums both horizontally and vertically in order to
achieve their goals. Those who seek to ration access to IP are
engaged in an elaborate cat and mouse game with those who
seek to expand access. As soon as one venue becomes less
responsive to a high protectionist agenda, IP protectionists shift
to another in search of a more hospitable venue. . . .9
Sell describes how those seeking ever increasing intellectual property rights
shifted forum from the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) to
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and then back to WIPO10, and then to
bi-lateral trade agreements, and the multiple other fora.
A. The ACTA Process
ACTA is being negotiated by trade representatives from the United
States, Australia, Canada, the European Commission, Japan, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea. Official statements
by negotiators such as the European Trade Commission claim that ACTA
“does not purport to create new intellectual property rights but to create
improved international standards as to how to act against large-scale
infringements of IPR”11 Despite this claim, ACTA provisions stipulate
penalties for non-commercial infringement, impose liability on a wide range
9

Id. at 5.
Id. (“Once the access to medicines coalition of developing countries and NGOs
mobilized in the WTO, the IP maximalists renewed their earlier WIPO deliberations on a
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) in an effort to secure IP protection that went beyond
TRIPS. However, the mobilized medicines coalition paid attention to WIPO and tried to
counter this quest with a Development Agenda for WIPO. The ensuing stalemate at WIPO
over the SPLT led the IP maximalists to pursue other avenues, including continued bilateral
and regional trade and investment treaties marked by TRIPS-Plus provisions as well as this
new pluri-lateral effort behind the IP enforcement agenda. Industry has been relentless
pursuing its IP agenda and circumventing developing country and NGO opposition,
favoring non-transparent forums of ‘like-minded’ actors.”)
11
European Commission Trade Office, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Fact
Sheet (November 2008), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf [hereinafter
ACTA Fact Sheet].
10
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of third parties, create new categories of rights, and effectively eliminate
exceptions and limitations granted by TRIPS. ACTA is sometimes
presented as a tough but practical means by some states to secure their trade
interests in economically difficult times. The reality is more complex:
The main actors in the ACTA process are “nodal actors” or
networks of state and private sector actors who coordinate their
positions and enroll nodal actors to help the cause. These are
not single issue coalitions of states, but rather a mélange of
private and public sector actors who share compatible goals
and continue to coordinate their negotiating positions over time
and across forums.12
ACTA is being created outside all of the existing multinational
organisations and is intended to create a new international organization.
Once the provisions have been settled, it is intended that they will be
applied to developing countries, especially emerging economies.
According to the European Commission Trade Office: “[t]he ultimate
objective is that large emerging economies, where IPR enforcement could
be improved, such as China or Russia, will sign up to the global pact.”13
Although official notification of a process that led to ACTA was first given
in 2007, it was only on 21 April 2010 that an official draft of ACTA was
made public, and then only after widespread protest and leaking of previous
drafts.14
B. ACTA Provisions
Any discussion of provisions of ACTA, or putative provisions suffers
from the secrecy of the process. At the time of writing only three public
drafts have been released and two of those have been redacted. The third,
distributed in October 2010, purported to require no further negotiations but
is indeterminate in key respects.
Even though negotiations have apparently concluded in the eleventh
“final” round the text released from that round is labeled “Predecisional/
Deliberative.” Further deliberations are remains hidden from public
12

Sell, supra note 8, at 5–6. Sell derives the term “nodal actors” from Peter Drahos, Four
Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations over access to Medicines,
28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 11, 35 (2007).
13
ACTA Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
14
The Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP) at the American
University Washington College of Law provides a webpage that hosts various leaked and
released versions of the drafting text. See https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

7

PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-08

scrutiny. It is therefore the potential rupture zone around each provision
rather than the precise wording of provisions which requires attention. The
secretive process and textual indeterminacy may still result in the re-writing
of the provisions or the (re) introduction of other more onerous provisions.
In addition, as the interception of medicines by the Dutch customs
authorities discussed later in this article shows, the nuances of legislative
drafting are disregarded when government officials act at the behest of
alleged rights holders.
The first chapter of the text sets out initial provisions and definitions.
Several key definitions have been introduced only in the October 2010
version of the text.15 The second chapter sets out provisions which require
changes to national laws. The second section of the second chapter which
is on civil enforcement binds states to grant peculiar categories of civil
penalty to claimants that consists of awards for unproven loss, entitled “preestablished” and “special” damages.16 The same article requires a
presumption in respect of damages for copyright works. One such
presumption is that damages presumed to be equal to an amount calculated
by multiplying the profit that the plaintiff would earn on authorized copies
by the number of unauthorized copies. The presumption requires the
logically fallacious conclusion that every infringing copy distributed is
equivalent to a lost sale. The conclusion is false because the infringing
copy would not necessarily be sold by a guilty defendant at the same price
as the plaintiff. The defendant would sell for less than the plaintiff's price
so as to make sales to those for whom the plaintiff's price is too high,
therefore sales to persons who wouldn't or couldn't buy at plaintiff's price
are not sales lost by the plaintiff due to the defendant's actions.17 In this
section ACTA seeks to overturn the basic economic principle that as prices
rise demand decreases by fiat.
The section also requires courts to grant injunctions without hearing the
other party in certain circumstances18 and to require alleged infringer's to
give information about other parties without allegations of infringement
having first been proved.19 These procedural requirements disregard the
15

For the first time in the ACTA process “counterfeit trademark goods” and “pirated
copyright goods” are defined in the text.
16
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Consolidated Text: Oct. 2, 2010, Ch. 2, Art. 2 (3),
PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow
“Official Text - October 2, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Text – October 2010].
17
States v. Dove, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2008 WL 4829881 (W.D. Va., Nov. 7, 2008) (“It is a basic
principle of economics that as price increases, demand decreases. Customers who
download music and movies for free would not necessarily spend money to acquire the
same product.”).
18
ACTA Text – October 2010, supra note 16, ch. 2, § 2, art. 2.4.
19
Id. ch. 2, § 2, art. 2.5.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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competence of courts to regulate issues of their own procedure, especially
the granting of injunctions, in common law countries. Interference in the
constitutional separation of powers is generally regarded as well beyond the
ambit of trade agreements.
The third section of chapter two, dealing with so-called border
measures, was designated in previous version of the agreement as applying
to all the rights listed in the TRIPS agreement; trademarks, patents,
copyrights, data protection, integrated circuit protections, trade secrets and
geographical indications: “For the purposes of this section, ‘goods
infringing an intellectual property right’ means goods infringing any of the
intellectual property rights covered by TRIPS.” In an apparent response to
widely raised concerns about access to medicines, the October consolidated
text states in a footnote “For the purpose of this Agreement, Parties agree
that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.”
Customs authorities are mandated to seize goods suspected of being
infringing goods. Customs officials are therefore granted quasi-judicial
powers to decide complex matters of intellectual property law which they
are ill suited to exercise. Customs officials are also required to give
detailed information about goods in transit to rights holders. Confidential
commercial information, usually disclosed to customs officials for taxation
and excise purposes will be disclosed to commercial competitors who
purport to be “rights holders” either prior to or after seizure. Customs
officials are also to destroy goods without a judicial hearing.
Border measures apply to the novel category of “counterfeit trademark
goods,” defined as “any goods, including packaging, bearing without
authorization a trademark that is identical to the trademark validly
registered in respect of such goods, or that cannot be distinguished in its
essential aspects from such a trademark, and that thereby infringes the
rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the
country in which the procedures set out in Section 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter 2
are invoked.” Since border measures apply to goods in transit this
effectively grants trademark holders a new right, the right to prevent the
transit of goods through a country in which they are not offered for sale.
The consequence of this is to substantially change trademark law in most
jurisdictions that require that goods be offered by way of trade in the
jurisdiction, and that usually reserve penalties, such as the forfeiture and
destruction of goods to courts, and then often only when intention is proved.
Section 4 entitled “Criminal Enforcement” requires imprisonment as a
possible sentence for infringement. The fifth section deals with what it
terms the “digital environment” and requires laws that require service
providers to remove allegedly infringing content on notice from purported

WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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rights holders.20 Service providers are also required to provide information
about third parties, including commercially confidential and private and
personal information, to purported rights holders alleging infringement.
The section makes use of an ambivalent term, “adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies,” which leaves considerable for proponents of
the enforcement agenda to insist that these include criminal sanctions.
The third chapter entitled 'Enforcement Practices' requires states to
commit resources to create specialized expertise on intellectual property
enforcement, and to convince their populations of the importance of
intellectual property as currently configured. States would thus enter into
mutually binding obligations to use state resources to create national
political economies dedicated to maintaining the status quo to be
established by ACTA, limiting their national sovereignty to adapt
intellectual property law to changes in technology.
The fourth chapter places obligations for international co-operation,
information sharing and capacity building in making ACTA operational on
participating states. Participating states are required to dedicate resources to
extending ACTA to other states in co-operation with the private actors
whose interests ACTA serves.21 Chapter five creates a new multinational
organization in all but name, consisting of a committee, which can control
its own procedures, and sub-committees are which are empowered to
involve non governmental bodies at will in their processes. The chapter
creates a mandatory consultation procedure that purports to oust the
operation of the World Trade Organization's Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. The sixth and final
chapter sets out the procedure for the signature and entry into force of the
20

The required notice and take down provisions are reminiscent of the United States
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
21
ACTA Text – October 2010, supra note 16, ch. 4, art. 4.3 provides: "1. Each Party shall
endeavor to provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, assistance in
capacity building and technical assistance in improving enforcement of intellectual
property rights for Parties to this Agreement and, where appropriate, for prospective Parties
to this Agreement. Such capacity building and technical assistance may cover such areas
as:
(a) enhancement of public awareness on intellectual property rights;
(b) development and implementation of national legislation related to enforcement of
intellectual property rights;
(c) training of officials on enforcement of intellectual property rights; and
(d) coordinated operations conducted at the regional and multilateral levels.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, each Party shall endeavor to work closely with other
Parties and, where appropriate, countries or separate customs territories not a Party to this
Agreement.
3. Each Party may undertake the activities described in this Article in conjunction with
relevant private sector or international organizations. Each Party shall strive to avoid
unnecessary duplication of the activities described in this Article with respect to other
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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proposed treaty.
V.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF COUNTERFEITING

The use of the term “piracy” in reference to copyright has historically
taken place outside of legal discourse, in rhetorical efforts by interests
groups seeking changes in the law or public perception. The term as
applied to copyright has not had a clear legal meaning.22 Earlier texts of
ACTA used the term in reference to some kind of infringement, without
defining it. The appearance of a vague rhetorical term as a central term in a
draft international instrument signals that the text is written entirely from
the perspective of the interest group that uses the term, if not by that group.
The term “piracy” is used in parallel with the term “counterfeit” in the
enforcement agenda and the text of ACTA. The October consolidated text
defines “pirated copyright goods” as “any goods that are copies made
without the consent of the right holder or person duly authorized by the
right holder in the country of production and that are made directly or
indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have
constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of
the country in which the procedures set out in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
Chapter 2 are invoked.”
The procedures referred to in the definition refer to obligations to
provide injunctions including those given without hearing the defendant,
damages and the destruction of property without compensation, and
requiring third parties to furnish information.
“Counterfeit” has historically borne a number of legal meanings, one of
which is indicating large scale production and sale of goods that bear an
intentionally deceptive resemblance to trademarked goods, while others
relate to the integrity of state issued currency. As the East African
experience recounted shows, the term is being used in the pursuance of the
enforcement agenda not only to refer to goods subject to copyright, patents
and other intellectual property rights, but also to constitute otherwise noninfringing conduct as an infringement, in some cases criminal infringement.
The term “counterfeit trademark goods” is defined in the October
consolidated text of ACTA; 23 however, the term “counterfeit” is not.
international efforts."
22
PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 28 (2002); ANTHEA WORSDALL & ANDREW CLARK, ANTICOUNTERFEITING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (1998) 1; Debora Halbert, Intellectual Property
Piracy: The Narrative Construction of Deviance, 10 Int’l J. for the Semiotics of Law 55
(1997).
23
ACTA Text – October 2010, supra note 16 (“[C]ounterfeit trademark goods means any
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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The use of “counterfeit” in the title of ACTA raises doubt whether the
term is intended to refer only to trademarked goods or to goods subject to
patents, and other forms of intellectual property, especially since the
agreement is according to the October consolidated text intended to apply to
a wide variety of forms of intellectual property. “Counterfeit” as used in
the title and preamble is invested with a vague but ominous meaning in
order to homogenize a heterogeneous set of regulations and practices, which
in turn are the implementations of objectives of the network of private and
state actors who have constructed the enforcement agenda.
The enforcement agenda appears to have been precipitated by the
adoption by WIPO of an agenda focusing on development.24 The rights
language employed by the access to medicines and access to knowledge
movements rendered the putative technocratic language of “minimum
standards,” which had previously been deployed to maximize intellectual
property rights, less effective.
The terms “counterfeiting” and
“enforcement” were therefore mobilised to invoke the language of security
in an era in which democratic governments in developed countries have
exhibited a tendency to allow security to trump human rights.
VI.

THREATENED EFFECTS OF ACTA ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

A. Negating Multinational Development
The immediate effect of ACTA, even before pressure is brought to bear
on developing countries, is the exclusion of most developing countries from
international decision making. It is thus a means of circumventing the
processes of WIPO and WTO. India raised this concern in a letter to the
WTO: “Another systemic concern is that IPR negotiations in RTAs and
plurilateral processes like ACTA completely bypass the existing
goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark that is identical to
the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or that cannot be distinguished in
its essential aspects from such a trademark, and that thereby infringes the rights of the
owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country in which the procedures
set out in Section 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter2 are invoked.”).
24
Two weeks after WIPO adopted the Development Agenda, United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab announced that USTR would seek to negotiate
ACTA in order to “set a new, higher benchmark for enforcement that countries can join on
a voluntary basis.” Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes
(Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-willseek-new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes; Japan and the European Union made a similar
announcement. See Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Viviana Muñoz Tellez, The Changing
Structure and Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement 25 (South Centre Research
Paper No. 15, Jan. 2008).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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multilateral processes.”25 Because WIPO is a United Nations organization,
it is duty bound to pursue development. One consequence of the
abandonment of their commitment to multinational decision making is an
effective abandonment of commitments to pursue the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly. Response by the leading emerging economies such as India and
China26 cannot be characterised as merely representing national trade
interests that happen to compete with those of the negotiating countries.
Instead, countries with emerging economies have many of the world’s
poorest people, who will be directly impacted by ACTA, living in them.
For example, India, the world’s most populous democracy, has some 456
million people living below the poverty line.27
C. Limiting Access to Medicine
ACTA threatens access to medicines through the indeterminacy of the
terms “counterfeit” and “enforcement.”
Similarly problematic are
provisions that require injunctions against a broad class of actors including
“a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises
jurisdiction, to prevent infringing goods from entering into the channels of
commerce” and requirements that customs officials intercept goods in
transit, applying the intellectual property law of the transit country. In the
current draft of the text, patents are excluded only from Section 3 of
Chapter 2, which concerns border measures. The exclusion operates
through a footnote, raising the question why it is not firmly placed in the
text. What is the status of the footnote intended to be? The wording of the
footnote itself requires attention: “For the purpose of this Agreement,
Parties agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.” Why
this circumlocutory language? Why not simply state that patents do not fall
within the scope of the section? The wording suggest that parties may enter
into other agreements in terms of which the section may apply to patents,
enabling developed countries to require developing countries to apply the
provisions of the section to patents in bilateral agreements.
Even if pharmaceutical patents are ultimately excluded from these
provisions (an exclusion that is not guaranteed given the lack of
accountability of the negotiators to elected lawmakers), trademark and
25

India's Intervention on “TRIPS plus IPR Enforcement” as delivered at the WTO TRIPS
Council (Jun. 9, 2010), available at http://keionline.org/node/864.
26
Id.; Proposal by China to WTO TRIPS Council (Jun 8–9, 2010), available at
http://keionline.org/node/883.
27
World Bank, New Global Poverty Estimates–What It Means for India,
http://go.worldbank.org/51QB3OCFU0.
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copyright claims can be used to block generic medicines.
For example, earlier this year German customs officials seized and held
a shipment of the generic drug Amoxicillin which was being shipped
through Germany to a least developed country. The drugs were held for
four weeks apparently because German customs officials were confused by
the alleged similarity of the generic name Amoxicillin with the
GlaxoSmithKlein brand Amoxil.28 The incident usefully highlights the
negative consequences for global health when customs authorities are
empowered and required to engage in determinations of intellectual
property rights in respect of goods in transit.
How these provisions and subsequent developments will affect access to
medicines can be seen through two instances of the enforcement agenda in
the developing world: the East African experience of new counterfeit
legislation, and the Dutch seizure of generic drugs in transit. The East
African countries of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda rely on generic drugs.29
Efforts by a group claiming a World Health Organisation mandate and the
European Union have resulted in “anti-counterfeiting” legislation in
Tanzania and Kenya and a legislative process in Uganda. The International
Medical Product Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) is described by
the World Health Organisation secretariat as “a partnership comprised of all
the major anti-counterfeiting players, including:
international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, enforcement agencies,
pharmaceutical manufacturers associations and drug and regulatory
authorities.”30 Historically, counterfeiting has referred to an intentional
violation of exclusive trademark rights on a commercial scale. However, in
East Africa, legislation or draft legislation defines counterfeiting as
infringement, including unintentional infringement, of not only trademark,
but also other intellectual property rights including copyright and patent.31
The Kenyan legislation defines goods as “counterfeit” if they infringe an
intellectual property right “in Kenya or elsewhere.” The consequence is
that even if a trademark or patent is not registered in Kenya goods which
28

“European Generic Drug Seizures Take Centre Stage at TRIPS Council Meeting,”
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Jun. 10, 2009),
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/48330/.
29
Wambi Michael, EU Supports Law Threatening Access to Medicines, INTERPRESS
SERVICE (Mar. 15, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50661 (“The European
Union (EU) is funding the drafting of Uganda’s controversial Counterfeit Goods Bill, a
proposed law that has caused an outcry as it threatens access to life-saving generic
medicines in this low income East African country. Some 90 percent of medicines used in
Uganda’s health-care system are imported, of which about 93 percent are generics.”).
30
http://www.who.int/impact/about/en/.
31
Johanna von Braum & Peter Munyi, New Enforcement Mechanisms Challenge the
Legality of Generics in the Name of Public Health: The Emergence of Anti-Counterfeiting
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allegedly infringe such a right elsewhere in the world may be subject to an
injunction or seizure. This represents a marked departure from the general
rule of territoriality for copyright, trademarks and patents that they have
effect only within the jurisdiction that grants the right.
On 23 April 2010, the Kenyan Constitutional Court suspended the
application of the Act with respect to medicines, as it bans import and
manufacture of generic medicines, and so infringes constitutional rights.32
The campaign to pass the legislation involved claims that the legislation is
necessary to prevent sub-standard medicines and other defective and even
dangerous goods.33 Typically, the legislation requires the state to devote
resources to create agencies or change the emphasis and power of existing
agencies, constitutes unknowing infringement as a criminal offense.
ACTA explicitly requires countries to enable customs officials to seize
goods in transit at the behest of purported rights holders. The provision
appears to be based on European regulations that have already been used to
intercept generic medicines in transit.34
European Council Regulations35 have been used on a number of
occasions by Dutch customs authorities to stop the transit of generic
medicines lawfully produced in India, on to be lawfully imported into
developing countries, that happen to be passing through European facilities.
In transit, seizures negate the freedom of transit guaranteed by Article 5 of
the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).36 The Doha
Declaration allows countries to manufacture, export, and import generic
medicine under compulsory licenses under certain circumstances. The
Dutch customs authorities, apparently unable or unwilling to parse the
complexities seized the medicines unlawfully.37
Experiences of the enforcement agenda in practise show that aspects of
that agenda embedded in ACTA, including the seizure of goods in transit
and an expansive notion of “counterfeit” already impede access to
32
The Kenyan Constitutional Court found that the Act 13 of the 2008 Anti-Counterfeit Act
arguably bans the importation of generic medicines and so infringes constitutional rights
and thus issued an order suspending the application of the Act to medicines pending a full
hearing on the issue.
33
Von Braum & Munyi, supra note 31.
34
Sean Flynn, ACTA and Access to Medicines, PROGRAM ON INFORMATION JUSTICE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG (April 28, 2010, 2:57 PM),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/acta-and-access-to-medicines.
35
Council Reg. 1383, 2003 O.J. (L 196) (EC).
36
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
37
TRIPS art. 31, read with paragraph 6 of the Doha declaration, allows member states to
issue compulsory licenses to manufacture and import generic medicines in certain
circumstances. Caroline Ncube, Enforcing Patent Rights against Goods in Transit: A New
Threat to Trans-Border Trade in Generic Medicines, 21 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 680
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medicines for people in developing countries.
D. Limiting Access to Knowledge
The policy space for developing countries was massively reduced by
TRIPS, which requires what it terms “minimum standards” of intellectual
property protection. Developed countries have generally complied, as
borne out by research findings from Africa that “in many cases, the African
countries studied provide even greater protection than international legal
norms require.”38
TRIPS imposed obligations on developing countries to pass and adhere
to laws based not on the conditions prevailing in developing countries, but
rather according to the requirements of trade offices in developed countries
acting on the behest of certain corporate constituencies.
Perhaps the most important revelation from this research is that
copyright laws in all study countries comply with international
copyright standards. In many cases, the African countries
studied provide even greater protection than international legal
norms require. Thus, the countries studied do not need advice
or assistance in drafting legislation to bring levels of legal
protection up to par. Simply put, Africa does not need stronger
copyright laws. Realising this point is urgent, as some of the
study countries—Kenya, Ghana, South Africa—are in the
midst of revising, or planning revisions, to their copyright
laws.39
In these circumstances it is not surprising, then, if intellectual property
legislation and practise diverge in developing countries. Research in Africa
found that:
Access to learning materials is obtained primarily through
activities that infringe copyright.
When—and if—the
enforcement of sanctions against copyright violation becomes a
greater reality in the study countries, then, without mechanisms
in place to promote and ensure non-infringing access to

(2009).
38
Tobias Schonwetter et al., Copyright and Education: Lessons on African Copyright and
Access to Knowledge, 10 AFR. J. INFO. & COMM. 37, 49–50 (2009/2010), available at
http://link.wits.ac.za/journal/AJIC10-Schonwetter.pdf.
39
Id.
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knowledge, many learners, particularly at the tertiary level, will
be in a precarious position and entire systems of education will
be vulnerable.40

ACTA will require precisely the enforcement that will cut off access to
learning materials in such countries. While TRIPS constrains what
exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights a country may make it does
not set out minimum exceptions, instead rendering the entire process of
writing exceptions and limitations far more complex than it was for
developed countries, which were free to create whatever exceptions they
deemed appropriate during their own development. Because of the speed
with which developing countries are expected to create complex intellectual
property legislation—legislation that has been developed over centuries by
developed countries—most developing countries have not developed
appropriate balancing provisions that enable access to knowledge. As a
result, infringement in developing countries, even widespread infringement,
is a symptom of a system imposed from outside, not suitable or even
meaningful to many in developing world.41 Enforcement required by
ACTA will deprive millions of people of their only viable access to
knowledge.
E. The Effect of Border Measures on Developing Country Exports
Broadly drafted border measures will enable global corporations to exert
pressure on developing country exporters, either barring them access to
markets or extracting licensing fees from them. This is illustrated by a
campaign by Monsanto to prevent the importation of soymeal from
Argentina into Europe. Monsanto had obtained a so-called “gene patent” in
Europe and the United States, which enabled it to exercise a monopoly over
the supply of a particular type of soybean for agricultural use.42 Monsanto
did not obtain a patent in Argentina, where crops of the bean where
processed to produced soymeal. Some of the soymeal was imported into
Europe. After a number of years without protest, Monsanto requested
detainment of shipments of the soymeal into Denmark, the Netherlands,
40

Id. at 50.
Id. (“Evidence from the study countries strongly suggests that the copyright environment
can be improved by legal reforms that make copyright more flexible and suitable to local
realities. Paradoxically, less restrictive laws could provide more effective protection,
because they would enable entire segments of the population currently operating outside
the copyright system altogether to comply with limited, realistic rules.”).
42
Carlos M Correa, Enforcing Border Measures: Importation of GMO Soybean Meal from
Argentina, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
81 (Li & Correa eds. 2009).
41
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Spain, and United Kingdom and made damages claims against European
importers of the meal. The claims were based on alleged violation of the
patent because it was alleged that the patented DNA sequences would, or
could, survive in the meal, even though the meal could not be used to grow
a new crop of beans. None of cases brought by Monsanto have succeeded,
with a number of setbacks by courts that have rejected the claim that the
patent could prevent the importation of an end product of the patent.
However, in the interim, the customs officials had seized and delayed the
shipments and charged the importers detainment fees.
Even if patents are excluded from the ACTA section on border
measures, patent holders will be enabled to obtain the range of other
remedies required by ACTA. As the actions of Monsanto in respect of
Argentinian soy meal shows a strategic use of alleged intellectual property
rights, even when those rights are not ultimately held by courts to apply to
products further along a value chain to the object of the rights, can create
considerable barriers to market entry by developing country farmers.
The campaign shows the potential of border measures for anticompetitive action. Intermediaries such as importers are likely to avoid
such conflicts even if the law is not clear, switching to new sources, most
likely those who have made strategic use of broad border measures. The
result is for developing country farmers who lack the resources to fight
sophisticated legal battles on foreign terrain is that they will lose markets
for their goods, with potentially devastating effects on rural economies.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The impact of ACTA on developing countries is intended to be far
reaching, taking into its scope different types of intellectual property,
including a range of measures including civil and criminal penalties, border
and information gathering requirements, and mandatory government speech
in favour of entrenched intellectual property regimes. As a consequence, it
is not possible to fully describe the likely impact of ACTA. However, an
examination of other instances of the enforcement agenda, of which ACTA
is merely one vehicle, leaves little doubt about the consequences for the
world’s poor if ACTA proceeds.
Table 1 lists some of the likely impacts of ACTA on development:
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Table 1. Likely Effects of ACTA on Development

Short Term
•

•

•

•

Interception in
transit of
medicines
Anti-competitive
blocking of exports
to developed
countries
Pressure to prevent
infringement that
gives access to
learning materials
Pressure to adopt
ACTA type
measure pre
signature of ACTA

Medium Term
• Recruitment of some
Developing Counties to
support ACTA
• Diversion of resources to
“enforcement”
• Decreased access to
knowledge due to measures
in force in developed
countries
• Disruptive restructuring of
global trade routes
• Decreased access to export
markets/growing barriers to
international trade
• Recruitment of public and
private security sector as new
enforcement constituency

Long Term
•

•

•
•
•

Undermining of fragile
civil liberties and rule of
law
Local political
economies of rent
seeking “enforcement”
Institutionalization of
enforcement agenda
Loss of policy space
remaining under TRIPS
Restrictions on access to
medicines, access to
learning materials and
technology transfer cause
development failure
leading to political
instability

Many of the effects cannot be avoided by developing countries simply
by refusing to accede to a treaty resulting from the ACTA process but
instead will directly from implementation of ACTA itself by the club of
drafting countries. Some of the effects, such as undermining the WIPO
Development Agenda and sidelining the World Intellectual Property
Organisation and the World Trade Organisation, are already under way.
The most immediate impact of ACTA is that the leadership of many of the
world's largest democracies, including Brazil and India, are shut out of the
ACTA process while it is being negotiated even though it will be imposed
on them later. That the treaty is being negotiated largely in secret makes it
difficult for developing countries with limited resources to track the
process, and even harder to respond to it through diplomatic channels.
In the short term developing countries will continue to experience the
effects of the enforcement through the interception of goods in transit
including generic medicines. In the medium term developing countries
would come under increasing trade pressure to adopt wide ranging “anticounterfeiting” measures which threaten access to medicines and access to
learning materials. In the long term developing countries would come under
increasing pressure to agree to ACTA and in so doing devote scarce
resources to furthering the commercial interests of a small but exceptionally
powerful group of multinational corporations, depriving their poorest
inhabitants of access to medicines and learning materials.
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